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TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS. BY MARK
TUSHNET. d1 PRINCETON: PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS, 1999. PP.
254. $29.95.
In recent years, many scholars have called for taking the Constitution seriously outside the courts, and thus looking
to legislatures, executives, and citizens generally for fuller protection of constitutional norms. In his book, Taking
the Constitution Away from the Courts, Mark Tushnet supports this view and travels “beyond judicial minimalism”
in order to argue that constitutional interpretation belongs outside the courts and directly in the hands of the people.

In this Book Review, Professor Fleming examines Professor Tushnet's arguments against judicial supremacy and in support
of making constitutional interpretation less court-centered to pursue a populist constitutional law. The review concedes that
Professor Tushnet's arguments that the “thick Constitution”--in particular, its commitments to federalism, states' rights, and
separation of powers--is self-enforcing through the political processes are compelling. But it contends that he fails to make
the case that the “thin Constitution”--for example, its fundamental guarantees of equality, freedom of expression, and liberty-should be treated as similarly self-enforcing. Furthermore, Professor Fleming charges that Professor Tushnet does not adequately
elaborate how legislatures, executives, and citizens should conscientiously interpret the Constitution, or sufficiently consider
how to revise our current practice to make it more likely that these bodies will fulfill their obligations to do so. Finally, he argues
that Tushnet's notion of the thin Constitution is too thin to constitute us as a people. Nonetheless, the review concludes *216
that Professor Tushnet has helped lay the groundwork for taking the Constitution seriously outside the courts, not by taking
it away from courts, but instead by taking it to legislatures, executives, and citizens generally. Moreover, Professor Fleming
concludes that Professor Tushnet's book is the most provocative and significant contribution to this project to date.
Introduction
In the wake of the Warren Court, constitutional law scholars with misgivings about judicial interpretation and enforcement of
the Constitution by the Burger and Rehnquist Courts have repeatedly called for taking the Constitution seriously outside the
courts, and thus looking to legislatures and executives for fuller protection of constitutional norms. 1 Mark Tushnet's Taking

the Constitution Away from the Courts 2 is the most comprehensive, thoughtful, and provocative answer to those calls to date.
For that reason, it warrants careful attention and serious criticism.
Tushnet offers powerful arguments against judicial supremacy in constitutional interpretation and provides an assessment of
judicial review that should sober even the most committed, court-loving constitutionalists. In addition, he advances the best
arguments I have encountered for the proposition that the Constitution is self-enforcing through the political processes rather
© 2022 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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than through judicial review. Finally, he sketches an attractive vision of populist constitutional law outside the courts. On this
vision, the “thin Constitution”--the principles, aspirations, and ends proclaimed in the Declaration of Independence and the
Preamble to the Constitution--constitutes us as a people. And we the people, who are engaged in a project of self-government
in pursuit of those principles, aspirations, and ends, are charged with, and are worthy of, the responsibility of interpreting the
Constitution ourselves as well as through our legislatures and executives.
*217 But Tushnet fails adequately to elaborate how legislatures, executives, and citizens should conscientiously interpret the
Constitution. Furthermore, he fails sufficiently to consider how to revise our current practice to make it more likely that these
bodies will fulfill their obligations to do so. My general criticism is that Tushnet does not establish that taking the Constitution
seriously outside the courts requires, in his terms, “taking the Constitution away from the courts.” Rather, I contend, it requires
taking the Constitution to legislatures, executives, and citizens in order that these bodies might better frame and guide their
reflections, deliberations, and decisions by constitutional principles, aspirations, and ends.
Furthermore, instead of eliminating judicial review, we should restrict it to provisions and commitments of the Constitution that
are properly judicially enforceable, and leave the enforcement of other provisions and commitments to legislatures, executives,
and citizens. This approach entails judicially enforcing constitutional norms in situations where the political processes are
systematically untrustworthy, but judicially “underenforcing” constitutional norms (to use Lawrence Sager's term) 3 in situations
in which the political processes are systematically trustworthy. In the latter situations, where we can trust legislatures and
executives to enforce constitutional norms, we should indeed take the Constitution away from the courts. 4

In criticizing Tushnet's book, I focus on three main points. In Part I of this Review, I assess Tushnet's arguments against judicial
supremacy. Although his arguments are powerful and persuasive, I maintain that they work better as a conscientious legislator's,
executive's, and citizen's guide to constitutional interpretation, within a system otherwise characterized by judicial supremacy,
than as a refutation of judicial supremacy itself. In Part II, I consider his arguments against judicial review and for the selfenforcing Constitution. I concede that his arguments that the “thick Constitution”--in particular, commitments to federalism,
states' rights, and separation of powers--is *218 self-enforcing through the political processes are compelling. However, I
contend that his arguments that the “thin Constitution” should be treated as self-enforcing are unpersuasive. In Part III, I take up
Tushnet's arguments for a populist constitutional law. I argue that his notion of the “thin Constitution” is too thin to constitute
us as a people, and I suggest that there are better ways of thinking about the thinness or thickness of constitutional law.
Finally, in Part IV, I develop the implications of my prior work for the project of taking the Constitution seriously outside
the courts--not by taking it away from courts, but by taking it to legislatures, executives, and citizens generally. Despite my
criticisms, Tushnet's book is provocative and radical in a good sense: It goes to the root of the matter, addressing the fundamental
question in constitutional theory of who may authoritatively interpret the Constitution. Perhaps one measure of the success of
Tushnet's book is that I-- an unabashed Dworkinian and a propounder of what might appear to be one of the grandest court-

centered constitutional theories of them all 5 --am persuaded by his arguments against judicial review and for the self-enforcing
Constitution to the extent that I am. It bears noting that many progressives like Tushnet have been dubious about judicial review
and skeptical about the Constitution in light of their progressive and egalitarian political and moral commitments. 6 To the extent
that Tushnet's book proves successful, it may mark a point in history at which progressives learn to hate judicial review but to
love the Constitution, or at least to affirm their faith in the Constitution without placing any hope in courts for the realization
of its core commitments.
I Tushnet's Arguments Against Judicial Supremacy
A. Who May Authoritatively Interpret the Constitution?
In developing his argument against judicial supremacy and for a populist constitutional law, Tushnet advances a distinction
between the thick and the thin Constitution. The thick Constitution, according *219 to Tushnet, “contains a lot of detailed

provisions describing how the government is to be organized.” 7 These provisions include evidently minor provisions, such
as the “opinions in writing” clause and many administrative provisions. They also include “detailed arrangements regarding
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federalism, states' rights, and the separation of powers.” 8 Tushnet suggests that the thick Constitution's provisions meet with

“public indifference,” for they “do not thrill the heart” or “generate impassioned declarations.” 9

The thin Constitution consists of “its fundamental guarantees of equality, freedom of expression, and liberty.” 10 Tushnet draws
upon the work of Gary Jacobsohn, who, quoting Abraham Lincoln, describes “‘[t]he Union and the Constitution’ as ‘the picture

of silver,’ the ‘frame[ ],’ around the ‘apple of gold,’ the principles of the Declaration of Independence.” 11 Tushnet adds, quoting
Lincoln: “‘The picture was made for the apple--not the apple for the picture.”’ 12 That is, “the frame of silver . . . was made

for the apple of gold.” 13 He contends, and interprets Lincoln as believing, that “[t]he project the Constitution established for
the people of the United States . . . was the vindication of the Declaration's principles: the principle that all people were created
equal, the principle that all had inalienable rights.” 14

Furthermore, Tushnet asserts that “the national project includes vindicating the parts of the Constitution's Preamble that resonate
with the Declaration: the nation's commitment to ‘establish Justice, ensure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common
defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to . . . our [P]osterity.”’ 15 Notably, Tushnet omits
from this quotation the first purpose or aspiration stated in the Preamble: “to form a more perfect Union.” 16 He believes that

this end “does not resonate with the Declaration's principles as the other purposes recited in the Preamble do.” 17 Evidently he
believes that it does not partly constitute us as a people.
*220 Tushnet states that “[p]opulist constitutional law vindicates the thin Constitution.” 18 Most importantly, he contends,

“the nation's commitment to the thin Constitution constitutes us as the people of the United States.” 19 He adds: “constituting

a people is a morally worthy project,” and “the thin Constitution . . . is an element in a good society.” 20 Together, Tushnet
maintains, “[t]he Declaration and the Preamble provide the substantive criteria for identifying the people's vital interests.” 21
Finally, he submits that “the thinness of the populist Constitution is essential if the position I am developing is to be at all
defensible.” 22 This submission, however, may undermine the entire enterprise, as we shall see.

Two observations are in order here. First, there is nothing inherently populist about the idea that the project that the Constitution
establishes for the people of the United States is the vindication of the Declaration's principles and the Preamble's aspirations.
Second, there is nothing about this idea that is necessarily against judicial supremacy. For one can certainly believe that
a constitutional theorist could embrace this vision of the project, yet be altogether antipopulist and projudicial supremacy.
For example, Sotirios Barber embraces this view in On What the Constitution Means 23 and The Constitution of Judicial

Power. 24 Additionally, one could characterize Dworkin's constitutional theory along similar lines. 25 On Barber's view, the
Declaration and the Preamble express our noblest commitments and our highest aspirations, which courts as the forum of

principle are obligated to vindicate against popular encroachment or neglect. 26 Of course, Tushnet might well retort to Barber,
“the constitution of judicial power indeed!”
Readers familiar with Tushnet's prior work (which is among the best work to grow out of the Critical Legal Studies movement) 27
may be surprised with his argument that the thin Constitution--which commits us to the project of vindicating the “inalienable
rights,” “universal *221 human rights,” and “unassailable moral truths” proclaimed in the Declaration of Independence--

constitutes us as a people. 28 For he has been quite skeptical about rights, 29 and indeed remains so, with certain qualifications,

in this book. 30 In addition, he is famous for making statements like “[c] ritique is all there is,” 31 which appear to be in tension
with such an evidently constructive and morally ambitious project. As a liberal who “takes rights seriously,” 32 I am pleased to
see a crit like Tushnet come out so unapologetically in support of inalienable rights, universal human rights, and unassailable
moral truths.
Before assessing Tushnet's arguments against judicial supremacy, we need to draw two further distinctions. We should
distinguish two common conceptions of judicial supremacy, which I shall frame in terms of paraphrases of Chief Justice
Marshall's famous utterance in Marbury v. Madison: “It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say
© 2022 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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what the law is.” 33 One is that the Supreme Court is the exclusive interpreter of the Constitution. Or, to paraphrase Marshall

in Marbury, “It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department--and no one else--to say what the law is.” 34
On this view, questions about what the Constitution means are nothing but questions about what the courts have said, or are
likely to say, about what the Constitution means. It is not required, and indeed not appropriate, for legislatures, executives, and
citizens to engage in independent constitutional interpretation.
The other conception of judicial supremacy is that the Supreme Court is the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution. Or, again
to paraphrase Marbury, “It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department--ultimately, after the other branches
of government have conscientiously considered what the Constitution requires of them--to say what the law is.” On this view,
legislatures, executives, and citizens generally have the obligation in the first instance to consider conscientiously what the
Constitution requires of them before taking contemplated actions. However, in the final analysis, the courts must authoritatively
interpret the Constitution and decide whether those actions comport with the Constitution. Constitutional theorists like Barber
or Dworkin can embrace this position, yet also argue ultimately for aggressive judicial review. To generalize, we *222 should
distinguish answers to the question who may authoritatively interpret the Constitution from conceptions of the proper scope
of judicial review.
It is also important to distinguish two common readings of Marbury. 35 One is the broad view that it is the special province of
the courts to guard the Constitution against legislative and executive encroachment. The other is the narrow view that it is only
incidentally the province of the courts, when they otherwise must interpret the Constitution, to enforce it against legislative or
executive encroachment. The former reading leads to a dim view of the idea of the Constitution outside the courts. But the latter
reading is not necessarily incompatible with a view that we should take seriously the idea of the Constitution outside the courts.
It is striking and problematic that Tushnet alludes to each of these distinctions, 36 but then elides each of them--and in turn elides

each into the other--and simply criticizes “a general theory of judicial supremacy.” 37 He may believe that these distinctions
are distinctions without a difference from the standpoint of his larger project of taking the Constitution away from the courts.
However, maintaining these distinctions will enable us to see that although he fails to make the case for taking the Constitution
away from the courts altogether, he succeeds marvelously in showing certain ways in which our current practice, rightly
understood, already contemplates that legislatures, executives, and citizens generally may engage in independent constitutional
interpretation.
Tushnet challenges the general theory of judicial supremacy in several ways. First, he mentions the political question doctrine,

which “leaves some constitutional decisions to Congress and the president with no possibility of judicial review.” 38 Second,
he notes other “situations in which it might seem that an official could reject the Supreme Court's constitutional interpretations
without running the risk of becoming the defendant in a lawsuit,” and thus giving the Court an opportunity ultimately to reaffirm

its interpretations. 39 Here he refers to certain famous instances in which courts upheld the constitutionality of legislation, but
then executives concluded instead that the legislation was unconstitutional. For example, President Jefferson pardoned political
allies convicted under the antisedition statute on the ground that it violated the First Amendment's protection of freedom of
*223 speech, notwithstanding the judicial determinations that the statute was constitutional. 40 And President Jackson vetoed
the national bank bill on the ground that it was unconstitutional, notwithstanding the Supreme Court's holding in McCulloch
v. Maryland that it was constitutional. 41

Tushnet rightly concludes, however, that “the fact that our constitutional system does not have a way to get the courts to
review some official decisions that conflict with the courts' constitutional interpretations does not really counter the theory of

judicial supremacy.” 42 He then asks, “When may a legislator disregard the courts' constitutional interpretations?” 43 Drawing
upon President Abraham Lincoln's analysis, he suggests that “sometimes legislative action apparently inconsistent with a prior
judicial constitutional interpretation is not inconsistent with a general theory of judicial supremacy.” 44 He states, however, that
“sometimes it is.” 45 Tushnet continues: “But in those situations the case for judicial supremacy is weak and the case for a

populist constitutional law implementing the thin Constitution is strong.” 46

© 2022 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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Let us begin with the first scenario. For example, proposed legislation may be distinguishable from legislation that the courts

have held unconstitutional. 47 Or, prior legislative action--or inaction--may be relevant to the courts' constitutional decisions. 48
Additionally, “[a] legislator might disregard an apparently controlling precedent, Lincoln suggested, when it was reached in
‘ordinary litigation between parties in personal actions.”’ 49 Or, again according to Lincoln, “a legislator may support a law

indistinguishable from one held unconstitutional when there is a ‘chance that [the earlier decision] might be overruled.”’ 50
Constitutional scholars celebrating or assuming judicial supremacy commonly fail to acknowledge these situations as part of
our practice. Yet they are, by Tushnet's own analysis, “fully compatible with a general theory of judicial supremacy.” 51

Next, let us address the second scenario. This includes situations in which public officials' disregard of clearly controlling
Supreme Court precedents may provoke a constitutional crisis. Tushnet contends *224 that “[t]here is nothing wrong in

principle with constitutional disagreements, or even with constitutional crises as such.” 52 Or, adapting one of Lincoln's phrases,
Tushnet suggests that “a constitutional crisis may be a good thing when ‘vital questions affecting the whole people’ are
involved.” 53 He states that the criteria for identifying when a constitutional crisis is a good thing--when the vital interests of

the whole people are at stake--are provided by the thin Constitution. 54 He contends that only a political leader who speaks

“for ‘the people as a whole’ can fairly identify their vital interests.” 55 He also claims that such a leader is justified in ignoring
Supreme Court precedents, and thus risking a constitutional crisis, in order to further the vital interests of the whole people at
stake on his or her reasonable interpretation of the thin Constitution. 56

Finally, he asks when ordinary citizens may disregard controlling Supreme Court opinions. 57 The answer, again, is that
“people acting outside the courts can ignore what the courts say about the Constitution, as long as they are pursuing reasonable
interpretations of the thin Constitution.” 58 In doing so, Tushnet submits, ordinary citizens are continuing the Declaration's
project.

Tushnet's chapter title, “Against Judicial Supremacy,” 59 is an overstatement, or a misnomer. For his argument in the chapter
does not succeed as an argument against judicial supremacy altogether. It is more successful as an account of what nonjudicial
actors legitimately may do in acting upon conscientious interpretations of the Constitution in the face of contrary judicial
interpretations, even within a general theory of judicial supremacy (as ultimacy). A better title for the chapter--to paraphrase the
title of Paul Brest's famous article 60 --would be “A Conscientious Legislator's, Executive's, and Citizen's Guide to Constitutional
Interpretation in the Face of Erroneous Judicial Interpretations.” 61

Tushnet overstates his arguments, in part because he fails to maintain the distinctions between ultimate and exclusive interpreter
*225 and between the narrow and broad readings of Marbury. Tushnet's arguments are dispositive against the conception
of judicial supremacy that views the Supreme Court as the exclusive interpreter and against the broad reading of Marbury.
The practices that he describes involve legislators, executives, and citizens taking the Constitution seriously outside the courts
in ways not contemplated or permitted by such views. But they are not dispositive with respect to the conception of judicial
supremacy that views the Supreme Court generally as the ultimate interpreter and with respect to the narrow reading of Marbury.
Those practices are entirely compatible with such views.
Therefore, Tushnet has not accomplished the central aim of his own project: that of making arguments against judicial supremacy
that are sufficient to underwrite the project of taking the Constitution seriously outside the courts by taking it away from the
courts. Nonetheless, he leaves standing the possibility that one could incorporate his analysis into the project of taking the
Constitution seriously outside the courts by instead taking the Constitution to legislatures, executives, and citizens generally.
Tushnet has cleared the ground for the latter project, to which I wish to contribute by drawing upon his analysis.
B. Why Has Constitutional Theory Remained So Court-Centered?
At the beginning of this Review, I noted that there have been repeated calls to take the Constitution seriously outside the courts.
Despite these repeated calls, why has constitutional theory remained so court-centered? And how might constitutional theorists
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break the stranglehold of this court-centeredness? 62 I shall mention six reasons why constitutional theory has remained so
court-centered, or six factors with which any constitutional theorist who seeks to break that stranglehold, such as Tushnet, must
reckon.
The first reason commonly offered is that liberals and progressives who idealize the Warren Court still may believe, despite
contrary developments in the last thirty years, “that the Supreme Court under Earl Warren--who left the Court in 1969--is the

Supreme Court today.” 63 This hypothesis is good for a laugh; no one enjoys taking jabs at law professors more than other law
professors. It reflects the tendency of law professors (and Tushnet more than most) to reduce everything to political terms. But
we must ponder the question more deeply.
*226 The second reason is a more modest, and more plausible, version of the first. Liberals and progressives realize that,

although the Warren Court is long gone, the Burger Court proved to be the conservative “counter-revolution that wasn't.” 64
They also sigh with relief that, although the Rehnquist Court repeatedly gives indications that the conservative counterrevolution
finally is in full swing, it typically does so in 5-4 decisions. They comfort themselves with the thought that the election of
President Clinton and his appointments of Justices Ginsburg and Breyer have moderated the Rehnquist Court somewhat. And
so, they hope, “if only Clinton could get a couple more appointments to the Supreme Court.” And, “if only Vice-President Gore
could get elected and get a couple more appointments.” Then, “if only,” and so on.
Furthermore, the Rehnquist Court--notwithstanding the strenuous efforts of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and

Thomas--has thrown enough crumbs from the table to liberals and progressives to keep their hope in the courts alive. 65 Some

scholars have disparaged, as a “hollow hope,” the idea that courts can bring about social change. 66 Any hope for liberal
and progressive goals growing out of occasional victories in the Rehnquist Court is surely a foolish hope. We should look
beyond these two political reasons for the persistence of court-centeredness in constitutional theory and take up law professors'
assumptions about the differences between courts and legislatures, which will suggest four institutional reasons for it.
The third reason is rooted in constitutional theorists' yearnings for coherence, or for a coherent body of constitutional law. Based
on assumptions about the differences between courts and legislatures, they believe that under a regime of judicial review-indeed judicial supremacy--we will get a more coherent body of constitutional law than we would get in a regime that left
most or all constitutional questions ultimately or exclusively to legislatures, executives, and citizens. *227 Even if Tushnet
were able to persuade such law professors that legislatures and executives historically have proven to be more coherent over
time--and courts less coherent over time--than they assume, they still would maintain that courts enjoy comparative institutional
advantages over those branches in this regard.
The fourth derives from law professors' desire for uniformity, or for a uniform body of constitutional law (which is not the
same thing as a coherent body of constitutional law). The points just made about coherence hold with respect to uniformity as
well. This yearning has particular force in our federal system, with a national government and fifty state governments, not to
mention countless local governments.
The fifth reason stems from constitutional theorists' yearnings for texts that express our national commitments, ideals, and
aspirations. They yearn for sources that express commitments worthy of our aspirations and that exhort us to honor those
commitments. Whatever the shortcomings of Supreme Court opinions as articulations of principles, ideals, and aspirations (as
distinguished from exercises in compromise, accommodation, and coalition-building), such opinions clearly enjoy advantages
in this regard over statutes, administrative regulations, and executive orders (which typically at best implement, rather than
articulate, such commitments). Besides, law professors love discussing the educative, expressive, and hortatory functions of

Supreme Court opinions. 67 Although presidents can, and do, deliver inspiring addresses, members of Congress are more limited
in this respect; even if they make eloquent speeches, or insert eloquent papers into the Congressional Record, they typically speak
only for themselves. One can imagine Congress revising its practices to provide opportunities for fuller and richer institutional
expression of commitments, ideals, and aspirations, for example, in committee reports on bills. But it is hard to imagine that
such reports or other institutional expressions could satisfy the yearning under consideration better than a good court opinion
or body of opinions. Thus, even if law professors exaggerate the educative, expressive, and hortatory functions of Supreme
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Court opinions, they are not unreasonable in thinking that courts enjoy comparative institutional advantages over legislatures
and executives in this respect.
A final, related reason stems from constitutional theorists' yearnings for an institution that might be, or might aspire to be, a

“forum of principle.” 68 Many are in the grips of a reductive, overdrawn contrast between courts and legislatures that leads
them to glorify courts *228 and to disparage legislatures. They no doubt hold too exalted a view of courts and too dismal
a view of legislatures. Yet whatever the shortcomings of courts, constitutional theorists are likely to believe that courts offer
greater promise than legislatures and executives in this regard. However, some theorists, like Sunstein, have partially flipped
this contrast and argued that legislatures and executives, not courts, are the true fora of principle. 69

For a scholar who believes in taking the Constitution away from courts, Tushnet does not adequately address these yearnings or
reasons for resistance. He does address arguments for judicial supremacy grounded in the view that it provides greater stability,
refuting claims or assumptions that constitutional law inside the courts is more stable than constitutional law outside the courts
would be. 70 Tushnet might think that the desire for stability subsumes the other concerns articulated above. But it does not.
Even if it did, a more fine-grained analysis would be needed.

Tushnet might claim that he has addressed the yearning for texts expressing national commitments, ideals, and aspirations and
the yearning for a forum of principle. In arguing against judicial review, he effectively debunks the idea that the Supreme Court is

an educational institution or a “teacher” in a “vital national seminar.” 71 But this is not sufficient. Even if this idea is overblown
and in need of being deflated, courts may enjoy relative institutional advantages over legislatures and executives in this regard.
II Tushnet's Arguments for the Self-Enforcing Constitution
Tushnet argues that the entire Constitution is self-enforcing through the political processes. 72 He analyzes the capacities and

incentives of legislators and executives to engage in responsible constitutional interpretation outside the courts. 73 Tushnet

also ingeniously develops the idea of an “incentive-compatible” or self-enforcing Constitution. 74 This idea suggests that the
incentives of legislatures and executives within the political processes make it likely that they will enforce the Constitution, or
at any rate do a better job of enforcing it than courts acting outside the political processes. 75 In doing so, he reworks James
Madison's classic arguments in The Federalist 10 and 51 *229 about the extended republic and about how “‘[a]mbition must

be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place.”’ 76
Tushnet argues that “judicial overhang”--the distorted way in which legislatures and executives view the Constitution in the

courts' shadow--has stunted the capacities of legislators and executives (and our views of their capacities). 77 He argues that
legislatures and executives might do a better job of fulfilling their constitutional responsibilities to interpret the Constitution if
we eliminated this judicial overhang by taking the Constitution away from the courts.
First, he argues that the “thick Constitution” is self-enforcing. 78 Second, he suggests that the “thin Constitution” should also

be treated as self-enforcing. 79 Tushnet makes a powerful and persuasive argument that the thick Constitution is self-enforcing
through the political processes. In particular, he argues that it is self-enforcing with respect to federalism and separation of
powers. There are familiar versions of this argument: Herbert Wechsler's famous argument about the political safeguards of

federalism, 80 itself based on Madison's classical arguments in The Federalist 45 and 46, 81 and a version of which the Supreme

Court, per Justice Blackmun, adopted in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority. 82 Justice White's argument
about judicial deference with respect to separation of powers issues 83 can be understood, or reconstructed, as an argument

about self-enforcement. 84 In addition, Jesse Choper wove together such arguments about federalism and separation of powers,
although to some extent his argument was not just about self-enforcement, but also about the need for the Supreme Court to
preserve its limited institutional capital *230 in order to enable it to vindicate individual rights. 85 But Tushnet formulates
this argument in an especially sophisticated and compelling manner. He satisfies the yearning of constitutional designers for “a
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machine that would go of itself.” 86 In sum, he argues that we can trust the outcomes of the national political processes with
regard to protection of constitutional commitments to federalism and separation of powers.
Constitutional scholars commonly argue that the Constitution is self-enforcing with respect to separation of powers and

federalism, but that it is not self-enforcing with respect to other provisions and commitments. 87 We could generalize the idea of
self-enforcement and include Ely's well-known argument for judicial review to reinforce the political processes in situations of
distrust. According to Ely, we can trust the national political processes to enforce the Constitution properly when separation of
powers and federalism are concerned, but we cannot trust those processes to do so when there are restrictions upon the political
processes or prejudice against discrete and insular minorities. Thus, according to Ely, we need judicial reinforcement of the
preconditions for democracy in those situations. 88

Tushnet, however, presents a different argument. He argues that not only the thick Constitution--including separation of
powers and federalism--but also the thin Constitution--including individual rights and the preconditions for democracy--is selfenforcing through the political processes. Tushnet grants that it might be attractive to develop a constitutional theory that views
the thick Constitution as self-enforcing, yet views judicial review as necessary to reinforce or secure the thin Constitution (in

particular, the preconditions for democracy or for populist constitutional law). 89 Although he does not spell out this possibility,
given his invocation of Ely's theory, it is clear how the argument would go. The idea would be that we cannot trust the political
processes with respect to the basic liberties that are preconditions for democracy (as understood within his conception of populist
constitutional law), and therefore we need judicial review to reinforce or secure those preconditions. Given the structure *231
of my own theory, as a Constitution-perfecting theory that is analogous to Ely's process-perfecting theory, I take particular
interest in this possibility. 90 Tushnet mentions voting, free expression, and privacy among such preconditions. 91 But then he

makes, and too readily accepts, skeptical objections to this approach. 92 Furthermore, Tushnet fails to consider the possibility
that even if the Constitution, thick and thin, is self-enforcing through the national political processes, it is not self-enforcing
through the state political processes.
III Reflections on the Thinness of Tushnet's Populist Constitutional Law
Next, I take up Tushnet's arguments for a populist constitutional law. His notion of the “thin Constitution” is too thin to do the
work of constituting us as a people. And there are better ways of thinking about the thinness or thickness of constitutional law. 93
A. The Constitution Through Thick and Thin
First, let us analyze Tushnet's distinction between the thick and the thin Constitution. Although one might draw a useful
distinction between the thick and the thin Constitution, it is odd that Tushnet draws the distinction he does, and calls the detailed
provisions regarding governmental structures and administrative matters the thick Constitution and the commitments of the
Declaration of Independence and the Preamble the thin Constitution. For one thing, the provisions of the thick Constitution, on
Tushnet's own analysis, are not as rich as, are less likely “to thrill the heart” than, and are more “desiccated” than, those of the
thin Constitution. 94 For another, the provisions of the thick Constitution are more obviously self-enforcing through the political
processes, even on Tushnet's own analysis, than are those of the thin Constitution. 95 Thus, the case for judicial enforcement
of the former is weaker, or thinner, than that for the latter. From this perspective, the thick Constitution is thinner with respect
to the justification for enforcing it judicially.
*232 Tushnet ignores Larry Sager's illuminating reflections on the thinness of constitutional law in terms of judicial

enforceability. 96 Sager observes that a striking feature of constitutional law is that the judicially enforceable Constitution is
thinner than the fuller Constitution that imposes obligations outside the courts which are judicially underenforced or even

unenforced. 97 This is not just a terminological quibble about the usage of the words thick and thin. There are also substantive
problems with Tushnet's distinction.
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Second, let us ponder what Tushnet includes in the thick Constitution as distinguished from the thin Constitution. It is notable
that, in a book published in 1999, Tushnet throws provisions and commitments regarding federalism, states' rights, and
separation of powers into the thick Constitution and claims that they are not part of the Constitution that constitutes us as a
people. 98 For we are in the midst of yet another new federalism in American politics and constitutional law. And the revival

of aggressive judicial protection of federalism, states' rights, and separation of powers is well underway. 99 In addition, there
is of course a longstanding tradition in American constitutional thought holding that commitments to federalism and states'
rights--even more than commitments to individual rights--constitute us as a people. Finally, there are insightful and powerful
arguments that these structural commitments, together with commitments to individual rights, establish a scheme of multiple
repositories of power and are constitutive of us as a people. 100

Indeed, it is telling that Tushnet argues that the Preamble to the Constitution is part of what constitutes us as a people, yet in his
initial quotation from the Preamble, he omits the aspiration “to form a more perfect union.” 101 Although he later acknowledges

this omission, and the link between that aspiration and the tradition of federalism and *233 states' rights, 102 he fails to consider
seriously the possibility that this aspiration might partly constitute us as a people.

It is understandable why liberals or progressives committed to realizing the other purposes of the Preamble and the principles
of the Declaration of Independence might be wary of federalism and states' rights (and to a lesser extent separation of powers).
After all, commitments to federalism and states' rights have long been identified with regressive and illiberal commitments
and have long stood in the way of liberal and progressive national reforms. But I would have thought that such liberals or
progressives would stress “to form a more perfect union” as importantly constitutive of us as a people and as partially repudiating
the states' rights tradition. One of the principal purposes of the Constitution was to form a more perfect union than existed
under the Articles of Confederation (which was more strongly states' rightist). 103 Similarly, one of the principal purposes of
Reconstruction, and the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, was to form a more perfect union than existed
before the Civil War. 104

A fundamental criticism of contemporary Supreme Court Justices who have revived aggressive judicial protection of federalism
and states' rights is that they do not appreciate the importance of the transformation from the Articles of Confederation to the
more perfect union of the Constitution, as well as the importance of the Reconstruction amendments, in constituting us as a
people. Furthermore, liberals and progressives committed to vindicating the principles of the Declaration and furthering the
purposes of the Preamble--as against state encroachment and as against states' rights conceptions--should stress “to form a
more perfect union” and our Constitution's commitment to a strong national government that is more perfect in securing those
principles and the status of free and equal citizenship for all.
Tushnet might not include commitments to federalism and states' rights in the thin Constitution because he is cynical about
those commitments or regards them as sham covers for conservative policies. The performance of recent Republican Congresses
supposedly committed to federalism and states' rights provides good cause for such cynicism. Conservatives profess respect for
federalism and states' rights, unless a state tries to secure a right that liberals support and conservatives oppose. For example,

the passage of the Oregon referendum *234 on death with dignity spawned the federal Pain Relief Promotion Act. 105
Conservatives claim that family law and tort law are within the province of state governments, unless they have a vision

that they want to impose nationally, for example, the Defense of Marriage Act 106 and tort reform. Moreover, conservatives
typically criticize the movement for an independent jurisprudence of state constitutional law, whereby state courts interpreting
state constitutions provide greater protection for certain rights than has been afforded by the United States Supreme Court
interpreting the United States Constitution. Some examples are the Kentucky Supreme Court on homosexuals' right to privacy
and equality (notwithstanding Bowers v. Hardwick) 107 and the Hawaii Supreme Court and the Vermont Supreme Court on
same-sex marriage. 108

Or perhaps Tushnet believes that the forces of nationalism really have won and that the latest new federalism is just the last gasp
of a dying tradition. If so, it might be a mistake to include federalism and states' rights in the thin Constitution as constitutive of
us as a people. But such a belief surely would be short-sighted, in light of the tenacity of the states' rights tradition (no matter
how wrong and wrong-headed that tradition is).
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Finally, we can eliminate another speculation. One can imagine a constitutional theorist who might wish to distinguish between
provisions of the Constitution that are self-enforcing through the political processes and those that are properly judicially
enforced. Such a theorist might want to put federalism, states' rights, and separation of powers in the former category, but to
keep rights of equality, freedom of expression, and liberty in the latter category. But, as we have seen, Tushnet is not such a
constitutional theorist. Although he begins with an argument that the provisions and commitments of the thick Constitution are
self-enforcing, he ultimately argues that the provisions and principles of the thin Constitution--those which constitute us as a
people--should also be treated as self-enforcing.
I believe that our constitutional commitments to federalism and separation of powers partly constitute us as a people, not only
in their own right, but also in their connection with substantive commitments *235 to freedom, equality, and justice. Yet those
commitments are properly treated as self-enforcing through the political processes. There is neither a need, nor a good argument,
for aggressive judicial enforcement of them, notwithstanding the Rehnquist Court's misguided revival of aggressive judicial
review in the areas of federalism and separation of powers.
Now let us take up the thin Constitution as Tushnet conceives it. The first thing to note about Tushnet's conception is just how
thin it is in what it includes. The thin Constitution consists of “its fundamental guarantees of equality, freedom of expression,
and liberty,” along with the principles of the Declaration of Independence and the purposes of the Preamble that resonate with

the Declaration. 109 It is not clear whether it includes the provisions of the Bill of Rights as a whole, to say nothing of President
Franklin Roosevelt's “second Bill of Rights” dealing with economics and social welfare. 110

The second thing to note is the thinness of Tushnet's account of the principles of the thin Constitution. He does not elaborate
its principles in a substantive constitutional or political theory. This is notable because many constitutional theorists who have
invoked the Declaration of Independence and the Preamble in constitutional interpretation have done so to bolster a substantive
constitutional or political theory, as against other constitutional theories that are said to omit, exclude, or ignore certain of our
deepest commitments expressed in those texts. Such theorists invoke the Declaration and Preamble in service of a substantive
vision of the commitments of the Constitution. 111

By contrast, in Tushnet's analysis, the thin Constitution serves not as a substantive vision but instead as a frame in terms of which
we should carry out constitutional interpretation and argumentation. A conscientious legislator, executive, or citizen should
frame his or her arguments about the Constitution in terms of carrying on the project *236 of realizing certain commitments
expressed in the Declaration and the Preamble. This is ironic, given that Tushnet builds upon Lincoln's image of the Constitution
being the frame for the Declaration, the apple of gold or the picture. 112 For it appears that in Tushnet's analysis, the Declaration
itself serves as a frame, rather than as a picture or substantive vision.

Put another way, Tushnet's notion of the thin Constitution as constituting us as a people stems from a view of the thin Constitution
not as manifesting a substantive vision, but as expressing an attitude of conscientious faith in the project of realizing the
commitments of the Declaration and the Preamble-- whatever the people may decide they turn out to be. This should come
as no surprise, given Tushnet's heartfelt acknowledgment in the preface of his book to Sanford Levinson, 113 the author of

Constitutional Faith, a book that propounds such a view. 114 Tushnet offers glimmerings of a substantive vision of what those
commitments are, beyond an attitude of commitment to a constitutional faith in the thin Constitution. Yet, he does not elaborate
those glimmerings, perhaps because doing so, on his view, might undermine the project of populist constitutional law. Indeed,
Tushnet differentiates his project of populist constitutional law from a view that the principles of the Declaration of Independence
and Preamble can be elaborated without reference to what the people, acting through self-government, actually decide to
pursue. 115 Presumably, he refers to the approach taken by constitutional theorists who elaborate a substantive vision of the
commitments of the Declaration and the Preamble.
B. Is the Thinness of Tushnet's Thin Constitution a Weakness or a Strength?
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Tushnet's thin Constitution is too thin to do the work of constituting us as a people. Furthermore, his account of how the thin
Constitution constitutes us as a people is too thin. He neither adequately explains what it means to constitute us as a people nor
gives an adequate account of what he means by a people. Although he gives some examples of conceptions of what it means
to be an American, 116 all of those conceptions are quite thin.

Tushnet likely would reply that, far from being a weakness, the thinness of the thin Constitution is a strength. He states that

“the thinness of the populist Constitution is essential if the position I am *237 developing is to be at all defensible.” 117 He
evidently believes that this very thinness is what enables the thin Constitution to constitute us as a people in a project of populist
constitutional law and self-government. He might say that, to pursue this project, we do not need a brilliant liberal or progressive
political or constitutional theorist to elaborate the substantive vision of the Declaration and the Preamble and then to argue for
imposing it upon an unwilling people from the top down. Instead, he might say, we need a text or texts for our constitutional
faith, and we need to encourage legislators, executives, and citizens, along with judges, to reflect conscientiously upon the
meaning and entailments of its commitments and how better to realize them over time.
I want to reflect upon Tushnet's views that the thin Constitution constitutes us as a people and that its thinness is a virtue. I
shall do so in light of arguments by both civic republicans and civic liberals that we need a thicker formative project or public
philosophy (than the one that allegedly prevails) to constitute us as a people. The very thinness of Tushnet's thin Constitution

is notable at the present time, when both civic republicans and civic liberals manifest such yearnings for a thicker vision. 118
Tushnet's thin Constitution is also notable for being even thinner than the visions of some prominent constitutional theorists
who have made the thinness of constitutional law a virtue. 119

First, if the thin Constitution is as thin as Tushnet says it is, can it really do the work of constituting us as a people? At its worst,
its commitments may amount to little more than the stuff of relatively vacuous slogans at Fourth of July celebrations. At its best,
its commitments may prove to be nothing more than a frame, or attitude, in the sense described above. Of course, Tushnet might
say that a thin Constitution as a frame or attitude is quite enough, and it is problematically elitist for constitutional theorists to
hanker for a substantive constitutional theory that would constrain popular self-government. 120

He also might say that the project of constituting us as a people is appropriately thin in a regime of populist constitutional law,
in which the point is to enable the people to govern themselves rather than to impose a conception of justice or a conception
of the good upon the *238 people in the name of constituting them as a people. For, he might contend, to constitute a people
is not the same thing as to govern them or to constrain their self-government. Rather, it is to establish a workable framework
or appropriate attitude and to leave it to the people to reflect, deliberate, and decide about the meaning and entailments of our
commitments in the Declaration and the Preamble through a project of self-government and populist constitutional law. He
might argue that it is especially appropriate that the thin Constitution be very thin, given what Rawls calls “the fact of reasonable

[[moral] pluralism” as a permanent feature of our constitutional democracy 121 (although Tushnet's project proves to be thinner,
in those circumstances, than a Rawlsian project would be).
Whether Tushnet's thin Constitution is thick enough to constitute us as a people depends importantly upon what we mean
by “constituting.” It could mean something as thin as establishing a people in the nominal sense: a people consists of those
persons who profess a faith in the principles of the Declaration and the Preamble, however they understand them or come
to understand them over time through a project of self-government. It could also mean something as thick as establishing a
people in a formative sense: developing in citizens the capacities for self-government, inculcating in them the attitudes, traits
of character, and civic virtues necessary for self-government, or indeed inculcating in citizens a conception of justice or a
conception of the good.

For example, Sandel's notion of a formative project of government to cultivate the capacities, traits of character, and civic virtues

required for republican self-government reflects a conception of what it means to constitute a people. 122 His idea of a formative
project of constituting citizens for a civic republican polity is much thicker than the project Tushnet contemplates. Moreover,
Sandel's idea leads to substantive moral argument--not only in political discourse, but also in constitutional law (along with a
rich public philosophy)--of a sort too thick for Tushnet's taste, especially to the extent Sandel contemplates judicial enforcement
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of that public philosophy, or of constitutional commitments in its name (as he does in certain respects). 123 From Sandel's
standpoint, the allegedly prevailing liberal public philosophy is too thin, and the constitutional law that it sponsors is too demoralized, to constitute us as a people. By analogy to Sandel's civic republicanism, Macedo advances a civic liberalism that
espouses a *239 formative project of developing in citizens the capacities, traits of character, and civic virtues required for

liberal constitutional democracy (as understood within Rawls's political liberalism). 124

From Tushnet's perspective, the projects of Sandel and Macedo, and perhaps even those of the allegedly prevailing liberal public
philosophy and constitutional law, are too thick. The latter point is suggested by Tushnet's analysis of “the constitutional law
of religion outside the courts.” 125 On Tushnet's view, only a thinner Constitution can constitute us as a people--one that can
embrace both Ronald Dworkin and Clarence Thomas, both Justice Brennan and Justice Scalia.

It may be illuminating to compare Tushnet's thin constitutionalism with that of his sometime coauthor, Cass Sunstein. 126 Each
of them proposes to take the Constitution seriously outside the courts. And each of them attempts to develop a theory that
is thinner than prevailing theories, thus making the thinness of constitutional law a virtue. Sunstein's development of judicial

minimalism in his new book, One Case at a Time, 127 can be interpreted, in part, as an answer to his own earlier call in The Partial

Constitution for taking seriously the idea of the Constitution outside the courts. 128 One might think that this call means that
not just courts, but also legislatures and executives, should be fora of principle. As such, it is a valuable corrective to overdrawn
contrasts between courts as the forum of principle and legislatures as the battleground of power politics. But for Sunstein, who

argues that legislatures and executives, rather than courts, are the true fora of principle, 129 the slogan “the Constitution outside
the courts” practically has come to mean “get the Constitution outside of the courts!”
One also might think that the call for the Constitution outside the courts promises to liberate constitutional theory from its courtcenteredness-- whether it be the court-centeredness of those who are obsessed with courts as vindicators of rights or of those who

are obsessed with the institutional limits of courts--or, in Mark Graber's term, to “delegalize” it. 130 Yet, ironically, Sunstein's
recent work may *240 shackle constitutional theory to concern for institutional limits of courts--or legalize it with a vengeance.
Tushnet carries this quest for thinness and minimalism even further. His avowed aim is to take the Constitution away from
the courts. And there is little risk that he will “legalize” the Constitution through judicial minimalism, for he disparages the
“formulaic Constitution” as uninspiring-- even “desiccated”--and ill-suited for the hortatory purposes of the Constitution in

populist constitutional law. 131 Tushnet goes far beyond Sunstein's theory of judicial minimalism, which seeks to make judicial
review democracy-forcing or -reinforcing. Tushnet goes all the way to a theory of the self-enforcing Constitution, in order to
let the people rule.
IV Constitutional Constructivism Outside the Courts
In previous work, I outlined and developed a constitutional constructivism or a Constitution-perfecting theory--a theory that
reinforces not only the procedural liberties, but also the substantive liberties embodied in our Constitution--by analogy to a

process-perfecting theory of the sort famously propounded by Ely and Sunstein. 132 At first glance, my theory might appear to
entail an aggressive theory of judicial supremacy; indeed, it might appear to be one of the grandest, court-loving theories of them
all. For one thing, my theory builds upon and has deep affinities with the constitutional theory of Dworkin, who is generally
regarded as one of the most judicial-supremacist, court-centered theorists around. In addition, it argues for courts securing not
only the basic liberties that are preconditions for deliberative democracy, much like Ely and Sunstein, but also those that are
preconditions for deliberative autonomy--basic liberties with respect to which many constitutional theories advocate deference
to legislatures for one reason or another. 133

*241 Yet, in the first instance, constitutional constructivism is a theory of what the Constitution is and how it ought to be
interpreted, not primarily a theory of who may authoritatively interpret it. It is a substantive constitutional theory that claims to
provide the best interpretation--in Dworkin's terms, the best fit and justification--of the American constitutional document and
underlying constitutional order, or to make them the best they can be. 134 It is neither merely a theory of judicial review, nor
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does it automatically entail that all its principles, aspirations, and ends are to be judicially enforced. It is addressed not only to
courts, but also to legislatures, executives, and citizens generally.
Here I want to address the question of who may authoritatively interpret the Constitution, with particular reference to the idea
of taking the Constitution seriously outside the courts. First, I draw together several intimations of a general view appearing in
my prior work. Second, I develop those intimations further.
In Constructing the Substantive Constitution, I note that “[i]n general, constitutional constructivism is a conception of what

the Constitution is, how it ought to be interpreted, and who may authoritatively interpret it.” 135 With respect to who, I state
that constitutional constructivism holds that, although the Supreme Court generally is the ultimate (but not the exclusive)

institutional interpreter in any given case, We the People are the ultimate interpreters of the Constitution. 136 It entails what
Levinson has called a “protestant” as opposed to a court-centered “catholic” conception of who may authoritatively interpret

the Constitution. 137 On this view, the Constitution is addressed not merely, and not even in the first instance, to courts; it is
addressed also to legislatures, executives, and citizens generally. To paraphrase Marbury again, “It is emphatically the province
and duty of the judicial department, the legislative department, the executive department, and the citizenry generally to say
what the law is.” This view is consistent with the best reading of Marbury: the narrow as opposed to the broad reading. It is
also consistent with the long tradition and practice of the president, Congress, and citizens claiming authority to interpret the
Constitution independently from courts. In short, the Constitution imposes obligations upon legislatures, executive officials,
judges, and citizens to take the Constitution seriously and to consider *242 conscientiously its implications for contemplated
actions before taking them.
Furthermore, I distinguish between the partial, judicially enforceable Constitution and the whole Constitution, which is binding
outside the courts upon legislatures, executive officials, and citizens generally in our constitutional democracy (unless and

until they amend it). 138 For example, although the Constitution might impose affirmative obligations upon the legislative and
executive branches of government, such as a constitutional obligation to provide a social minimum of goods and services to
meet the basic needs of all citizens, it might not accord a judicially enforceable right to such subsistence in the absence of
legislative or executive measures. Other constitutional theorists, upon whose work I have built, have expressed similar views
concerning the gap between the judicially enforceable Constitution and the Constitution that is binding outside the courts. 139

I also argue, drawing upon Rawls and Dworkin, respectively, that the Supreme Court is an “exemplar of public reason” in a

“forum of principle.” 140 But, like Rawls and unlike Dworkin, I argue that it is not the exclusive voice of such reason, nor is it
the sole forum of principle: “‘[W]hile the Court is special in this respect, the other branches of government can certainly, if they
would but do so, be forums of principle along with it in debating constitutional questions.”’ 141 In other words, constitutional
constructivism is a theory of the Constitution, not merely a theory of judicial review. Moreover, judicial review is subject to
certain institutional limits in carrying out social reform.

In American Constitutional Interpretation, 142 a casebook I coauthored with Walter Murphy and Sotirios Barber, we conceive
the enterprise of constitutional interpretation on the basis of three basic interrogatives: What is the Constitution?; Who may

authoritatively interpret it?; and How ought it to be interpreted? 143 In our treatment of the questions What? and Who? and in
our selection of cases and materials bearing on those questions, we commit ourselves to a rather muscular conception of the
Constitution outside the courts, rather than simply focusing on constitutional interpretation by courts and on constitutional law
as the product of Supreme Court decisions. In The Canon and the Constitution Outside the Courts, Barber and I briefly develop
*243 that conception with reference to the issue of “the canon of constitutional law.” 144

Finally, in Fidelity, Basic Liberties, and the Specter of Lochner, 145 I argue for judicial underenforcement of economic liberties
and property rights. I grant that economic liberties and property rights, like personal liberties, are fundamental rights secured
by our Constitution. 146 In fact, I contend that economic liberties and property rights are so fundamental in our constitutional
scheme, and so sacred in our constitutional culture, that there is no need, and no good argument, for aggressive judicial protection

of them. 147 Rather, such liberties are properly understood as “judicially underenforced norms,” to use Sager's term. 148 Their
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fuller enforcement and protection is secure with legislatures and executives in “the Constitution outside the Courts,” as Sunstein
would put it. 149

I also criticize the organizers of--and most of the participants in--the symposium in which that paper appeared for failing
to recognize the distinction between the judicially enforceable Constitution and the Constitution that is binding outside the

courts. 150 What turns on this distinction is whether protection of constitutional rights is confined to judicial enforcement or
whether it also includes enforcement by legislatures and executives. Also at stake is whether legislatures and executives, when
acting in the absence of judicially enforceable rights, should be seen as bound by constitutionally imposed obligations or instead
as free to act in constitutionally gratuitous ways. To say that a right is not judicially enforceable is not to say that it concerns a
matter that is constitutionally gratuitous in the sense that legislatures, executives, and citizens generally are free to protect it or
not as they wish. Rather, a right that is not judicially enforceable imposes obligations upon legislatures, executives, and citizens
to respect it or indeed to protect it affirmatively. Legislatures and executives, as well as courts, have responsibilities to interpret
the Constitution conscientiously and to secure our basic liberties.
In elaborating on this argument, I incorporate portions of Tushnet's analysis but also point out the need for certain things that
are missing from his analysis. I have stated that in talking about judicial supremacy, it is important to distinguish between two
versions, ultimate (or final) and exclusive (or only). Many constitutional theorists, *244 including Tushnet, acknowledge that
distinction, yet put it aside or ignore it. In fact, Tushnet's arguments against judicial supremacy are cogent against the exclusivity
version of it, but not with respect to the ultimacy version. Indeed, Tushnet carefully couches his arguments, making claims about
what nonjudicial actors who disagree with courts may conscientiously do even in a regime with a general theory of judicial
supremacy. Here he surely means judicial supremacy as ultimacy, because his claims would not make sense in a regime of
judicial supremacy as exclusivity. Tushnet, however, then proceeds as if he demolished judicial supremacy as ultimacy as well.
Not so fast. It is possible, and eminently defensible, to adopt his arguments against judicial supremacy without foreswearing
judicial supremacy as ultimacy.
Tushnet's analysis suggests some of the things we should do if we are to take the Constitution seriously outside the courts.
First, we should develop, or reinvigorate, a rigorous and coherent notion of political questions, that is, questions the resolution
of which the Constitution commits to institutions besides the courts. We need not only a carefully articulated justification for
the idea of political questions in general (after all, the doctrine has taken a beating from court-centered or court-loving judicial
supremacists), but also a clearly specified set of political questions.
Second, we should generalize the notion of political questions in service of an argument that nonjudicial actors have an obligation
to take the Constitution seriously outside the courts, as well as in service of an argument for judicial deference to such actors in
certain circumstances. Many arguments for judicial deference to the judgments of legislatures and executives simply emphasize
the respect that courts owe the coordinate branches of government. Those arguments should go deeper, and ask why respect
should be due a coordinate branch of government. The most defensible answer to that question is that the coordinate branch of
government, like courts, is under the obligation conscientiously to interpret the Constitution before taking contemplated actions
and is presumed to have discharged that obligation.
Put another way, we should revive, but reconstruct and prune, an element in Thayer's classic argument for judicial deference to

the national legislature and executive. 151 Thayer presumed that Congress and the president, not courts, had primary authority to
interpret the Constitution. For him, the question of judicial review was not a question of what the Constitution means, but instead
a question of whether the judgment of Congress or the president about what the Constitution means was itself reasonable, or at

any rate not clearly unreasonable. *245 152 The part of Thayer that I would reconstruct and prune is the idea that legislatures
and executives have the authority and the obligation independently to interpret the Constitution. The part of Thayer that I
would eliminate is the idea that courts are to be concerned solely with the question of reasonableness, not with the question of
constitutionality. Furthermore, I would reject his stance of judicial deference to the national political processes across the board;
instead, I would favor such deference only outside the situations in which we have good reason to distrust those processes.
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We must recognize, as Tushnet argues, that the Constitution is self-enforcing through the political processes in large areas
in which the Supreme Court is quite aggressive today, including most importantly the areas of federalism, states' rights, and
separation of powers. 153

We must also recognize that the Constitution is not self-enforcing through the political processes in general or in certain other
areas. In particular, it is not self-enforcing with respect to individual rights in what Tushnet calls the thin Constitution, especially
those rights which are preconditions for the trustworthiness of the outcomes of the political processes. Thus, a Constitutionperfecting or Constitution-reinforcing approach to judicial review is warranted in these areas.
Finally, we must recognize that the contrast between courts as the forum of principle and legislatures as the battleground of
power politics is overstated. In constitutional theory, there are several familiar responses to this contrast, including several
familiar attempts to blunt it. One approach is to obliterate the contrast, saying that neither institution is a forum of principle and
that not only legislatures but also courts are battlegrounds of power politics. This approach is common in both political science
literature about courts and in public choice literature in legal scholarship. 154

A second approach is partially to invert the contrast and to say that, historically, legislatures and executives have been the true

fora of principle, or at least better fora of principle than courts. 155 Proponents *246 of this approach typically charge that the
contrast rests upon a historically myopic idolization of the Warren Court. This approach does not literally invert the contrast
because it does not claim that courts are a battleground of power politics. The typical view, instead, is that courts “follow
the election returns” rather than being an independent bulwark of rights or forum of principle. Another variation posits that
when courts do not follow the election returns, they typically lag behind rather than forge ahead and therefore, historically,
have largely been conservative rather than liberal or progressive. Thus, this approach leads to the claim that legislatures and
executives, historically, have been more reliable and more effective forces for liberal or progressive change--and for the fuller
realization of constitutional principles of freedom, equality, and justice--than have courts.
A third approach, which I take, is to argue that taking the Constitution seriously outside the courts requires that legislatures and
executives, along with courts, be fora of principle in certain respects. This approach is implicit in Rawls's statement, quoted
above: “[W]hile the Court is special in this respect [as an “exemplar of public reason” in a “forum of principle” ], the other
branches of government can certainly, if they would but do so, be forums of principle along with it in debating constitutional
questions.” 156 Such an approach grows out of Rawls's conception of constitutional democracy. I believe that such an approach is
broadly compatible with Gutmann and Thompson's conception of deliberative democracy in Democracy and Disagreement. 157
This approach might seem to reflect a view that legislatures and executives are no different from courts in this respect, but it need
not. The point is that the contrast is overdrawn and that legislatures and executives, like courts, have obligations conscientiously
to engage in constitutional interpretation and to vindicate constitutional norms.

For this approach to get off the ground, we need an account of constitutional interpretation outside the courts. That is, we need an
account of what legislatures and executives are supposed to do when they engage in conscientious constitutional interpretation.
It would be unpersuasive to contend that legislatures and executives are obligated to do exactly what courts must do when they
engage in conscientious constitutional interpretation. Such an approach is both unrealistic and undesirable. We need and benefit
from an institutional division of labor, even if we should not overstate what that division of labor is.
At the same time, it would be unpersuasive to say that we should take the Constitution away from the courts and just let
legislatures and *247 executives go on as before. This course of action might be more acceptable for the president than for
Congress, given the practice of the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) in advising the President on constitutional issues. To be
sure, the advice that the OLC renders is probably more court-centered than would be desirable in a “protestant” constitutional

regime that takes the Constitution seriously outside the courts, but at least it is something. 158 Furthermore, because presidents
in our “extended republic” may have more critical distance and detachment from the pressure of particular interests than do
representatives and even senators, they may have more room to reflect upon and deliberate about constitutional questions.
Tushnet does not provide a full account of how legislatures and executives should go about interpreting the Constitution
once we “take the Constitution away from courts.” He mainly clears the ground for such an account and implies, in arguing
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against judicial supremacy, that legislators and executives may be more conscientious in resisting judicial interpretations of the
Constitution than is commonly recognized. 159 He also says, in defending the capacities of legislators and executives to engage

in conscientious constitutional interpretation, that “judicial overhang” may stunt the growth of such capacities. 160 He strongly
implies that legislators and executives would do a better job of interpreting the Constitution if judicial overhang were eliminated
by taking the Constitution away from courts. 161 He is far less cynical, and far more sanguine, in assessing the incentives of
legislatures and executives to engage in conscientious constitutional interpretation, than are most constitutional law professors
and political science professors. 162

Fair enough. But we still need a fuller account of how legislators and executives should go about conscientiously interpreting the
Constitution. Of course, Tushnet might contend that we do not need such an account because, on his view, the thick Constitution
is already *248 self-enforcing through the political processes and the thin Constitution should be treated as self-enforcing.
Perhaps Tushnet's argument entails nothing more than the suggestion that legislators, executives, and citizens should frame their
reflections, deliberations, and decisions more explicitly in terms of furthering the project of the thin Constitution. Thus, once
we take the Constitution away from courts, it might turn out that the reflections, deliberations, and decisions of conscientious
legislators, executives, or citizens would otherwise go on pretty much as before. In other words, Tushnet may have propounded
as full an account of constitutional interpretation outside the courts as he needs or wants, given his conception of the thin
Constitution and of its role in populist constitutional law.
But it seems that we need a richer account of constitutional interpretation outside the courts by legislatures, executives, and
even citizens generally than Tushnet provides, as well as a richer account of legislation itself. One account, implicitly provided

by Louis Fisher in his voluminous work on the Constitution outside the courts, 163 is that Congress and the president do a
better job of protecting constitutional structures and rights than court-loving constitutional scholars would ever appreciate or
acknowledge. Indeed, he claims that legislatures and executives do a better job than courts in this respect. This account reflects
the view that Congress and the president have engaged in conscientious constitutional interpretation all along, even if they have
not had a well articulated account of how to do so.
Another account, offered by Keith Whittington in Constitutional Construction, 164 is that Congress and the president are
obligated to engage in, and have engaged in (to a larger extent than is realized), a practice of constitutional construction as

distinguished from the practice of constitutional interpretation as it is carried on by courts. 165 One might welcome Whittington's
account of construction without accepting his contrasting account of judicial interpretation. Furthermore, one might combine
Whittington's account of constitutional construction by legislatures and executives with a Dworkinian account of constitutional
interpretation by judges.
Still another approach, offered by Jeremy Waldron in The Dignity of Legislation, 166 is to provide a more positive picture
of legislation than that which has characterized recent discussions of the relative institutional competences of courts and
legislatures. This picture, as his title *249 suggests, would stress the dignity of legislation. Waldron evidently aspires to

do for legislation what Dworkin is thought to have done for adjudication. 167 At the same time, Waldron also offers a more
disparaging picture of adjudication than is common in the work of American constitutional scholars. Although Waldron's project
of dignifying legislation certainly is a worthy one, it is not clear that he has realized it or that American legislatures are likely
to live up to it. At the very least, however, Waldron has persuaded me that we must rethink our overly disparaging picture of
legislation. Together, Waldron and Tushnet have persuaded me that we must rethink our overly glorifying picture of adjudication.
Conclusion
Realization of the calls for taking the Constitution seriously outside the courts and for developing forms of constitutional theory
that are less court-centered has been slower than we might have hoped or expected. Tushnet's Taking the Constitution Away
from the Courts makes considerable progress on this project. Notwithstanding my criticisms, I believe it to be Tushnet's best
book yet and to be as provocative and significant a contribution to this project as we have seen to date. It certainly has helped
clear the ground for others to carry forward this project.
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